In a significant decision for survivors, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized a new tort of intimate partner violence.
In Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia (2026 SCC 16), the Court held that existing torts such as assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress do not always fully capture the harm caused by coercive control in an intimate relationship. The new tort is narrower than the tort of family violence recognized at trial, but it recognizes that intimate partner violence may involve more than discrete incidents of physical or psychological harm. It may also involve a pattern of coercive and controlling conduct that undermines a person’s autonomy, dignity and equality within the relationship.
The decision is important because it gives survivors another potential basis to seek civil damages in cases involving coercive control. It does not mean that every harmful or high-conflict relationship will give rise to a tort claim. But it does recognize that, in some cases, the law must be able to respond to the broader harm caused by domination, isolation, intimidation, financial control, humiliation, sexual coercion and other forms of control within an intimate partnership.
In this blog post, I’ll outline the Court’s decision, what the new tort requires, and why the decision matters for survivors considering whether to pursue a civil claim.
What Led to This Decision?
The case began as family law proceedings between Kuldeep Kaur Ahluwalia and Amrit Pal Singh Ahluwalia. In Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2022 ONSC 1303, the parties appeared before Ontario Superior Court Justice Renu Mandhane for an 11-day trial addressing property equalization, child support, spousal support, and Kuldeep’s claim for damages arising from Amrit’s abuse during their 16-year marriage.
Kuldeep Ahluwalia, who self-represented during proceedings, did not specifically list the torts of assault, battery, or intentional infliction of emotional distress in her pleadings.
Justice Mandhane awarded Kuldeep $150,000 in compensatory, aggravated and punitive damages for a new tort of family violence. She found that the marriage was not merely “unhappy” or “dysfunctional,” but violent, and that the abuse Ms. Ahluwalia endured was not compensated through spousal support. On the facts before her, Justice Mandhane concluded that Ms. Ahluwalia was entitled to a tort remedy that accounted for the breach of trust occasioned by Mr. Ahluwalia’s violence and brought some measure of personal accountability to his conduct.
Justice Mandhane also noted that she would have awarded the same amount in the alternative for the “included” torts of assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Prior to appearing before the Court of Appeal, Amrit Ahluwalia accepted that his abusive conduct gave rise to liability under existing torts. However, on appeal he successfully sought a ruling to reduce the damages awarded at trial to $100,000 and a declaration that no new tort of domestic violence or coercive control should be recognized. The Supreme Court did not disturb the $100,000 quantum, but it characterized the award as compensatory damages for the tort of intimate partner violence.
The Supreme Court’s Decision.
Although the Ahluwalias agreed not to contest the Court of Appeal ruling on the amount awarded in damages, they disagreed on the basis for liability in tort. Kuldeep Ahluwalia’s position was that the trial judge’s decision to award damages based on a novel intentional tort of family violence was correct. Amrit Ahluwalia argued that existing torts (battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress) were a sufficient basis for the award and no common law precedent for a new tort should be set.
Writing for five members of the Court, Justice Nicholas Kasirer recognized a new tort of intimate partner violence as opposed to a tort of family violence. He explained:
“In order to establish liability under this new tort, a plaintiff must prove three elements: first, that the abusive conduct arose in an intimate partnership or its aftermath; second, that the defendant intentionally engaged in that conduct; and third, that the conduct, on an objective measure, constitutes coercive control. Harm flows from proof of the intentional wrong because coercive control directly interferes with the plaintiff’s legal interests in dignity, autonomy, and equality within an intimate partnership.”
On the trial judge’s findings, the Court held that Ms. Ahluwalia had made out all three elements of the tort. Justice Kasirer stated: “Cumulatively, Mr. Ahluwalia’s conduct subordinated Ms. Ahluwalia to his will in a manner that undermined her rights to dignity and autonomy as a person and to equality in the relationship.”
In explaining the basis for the new tort, Justice Kasirer emphasized that intimate partner violence is not limited to physical violence or discrete incidents of psychological harm. It may include tactics of isolation, manipulation, humiliation, surveillance, economic abuse, sexual coercion and intimidation. The focus is on coercive and controlling conduct that, viewed objectively and in context, undermines a person’s autonomy, dignity and equality within an intimate partnership.
The Court also made clear that an intimate partnership is not defined only by marriage, cohabitation or sexual relations. What matters is the substance of the relationship, including the social, emotional, financial or physical interdependence between the parties. While the tort will often involve a pattern of conduct over time, a single act may be sufficient where, viewed objectively and in context, it operates to control, isolate or entrap the other partner.
In terms of the specific case at hand, Justice Kasirer wrote: “The dispute between Ms. Ahluwalia and her violent ex‑husband is emblematic of the inadequacy of private law in its present guise to account for how vulnerable persons in intimate partnerships experience harm at the hands of the very individuals in whom they have placed their trust. Part of this inadequacy reflects the law’s entrenched and outmoded tendency to avoid entering the realm of intimate family relations, even when there are signs that things have gone very wrong.”
It is also important to be clear about what the decision does not mean.
The new tort does not replace existing torts such as assault, battery or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Those claims may still be important, depending on the facts. The decision also does not mean that every dysfunctional, painful or high-conflict relationship will now give rise to liability. The Court was careful to distinguish coercive control from the hurtful, angry or vengeful behaviour that can arise when intimate relationships break down.
What the decision does recognize is that coercive control may cause a distinct legal harm. It is not simply a collection of individual incidents. It can deprive a person of autonomy, dignity and equality within the relationship. That is the gap the new tort is intended to address.
What Does This Decision Mean in Practice?
For survivors, the decision is significant because it recognizes coercive control as a distinct civil wrong. Survivors will not necessarily have to frame the harm they experienced as a series of separate assaults, threats, or incidents of emotional distress. In the right case, the court can consider the broader pattern of conduct and the way it affected the survivor’s autonomy, dignity and equality within the relationship.
At the same time, the decision does not make these claims simple. The evidence will still matter. Courts will have to look carefully at the relationship, the surrounding context, and the cumulative impact of the conduct. The new tort is not meant to capture every painful or high-conflict relationship breakdown. It is directed at coercive and controlling conduct that, viewed objectively and in context, deprived one partner of autonomy within the relationship.
The decision also leaves important questions for future cases, including how damages will be assessed in different factual circumstances and how courts will apply the tort where coercive control continues after separation.
We Can Help.
The decision in Ahluwalia is an important development in Canadian tort law and in the law’s response to intimate partner violence. It recognizes that coercive control can be a civil wrong in and of itself, and that the harm caused by that conduct may not be fully captured by older tort categories focused on discrete incidents of physical or psychological injury.
For survivors considering whether to pursue a civil claim, the decision is significant. It does not make these cases easy, and it does not remove the emotional, evidentiary or practical challenges that often come with litigation. But it does recognize that coercive control can cause a distinct legal harm — one that may now be addressed directly in a civil claim.
If you or someone you care about has experienced intimate partner violence and would like to understand what this decision may mean in the context of a potential civil claim, you can contact me for a confidential, no-obligation consultation.