In Search of Deep Pockets: Suing the Broker: Broker’s Negligence from a Plaintiff’s Perspective


Given the changes made to the insurance scheme in Ontario in 2016 and the resulting vast reduction in damages available to be recovered from an insurer, the nature of the practice of insurance law has been altered in response, such that cases of this nature are drying up in the province. This has prompted discussion amongst members of the bar regarding whom else may be considered liable to an insured who has suffered losses. In other words, plaintiff’s counsel are seeking other pockets from which to recover damages for loss. One such source of potential liability is the insurance broker. There are a number of ways in which an insurance broker may be found to be liable, including failing to ensure that an insured has suitable insurance coverage, selling an insured a policy of insurance that is subject to exclusions because of a failure on the part of the broker to ask the right questions in order to ensure that the client has adequate coverage, and suggesting or allowing an insured to opt out of elective coverage when in fact the insured should have opted in for at least some additional coverage. This paper will examine each of these areas of broker’s negligence in turn, from the perspective of a plaintiff seeking to recover the maximum amount of damages possible, whilst operating in the uncertain insurance recovery landscape faced by Ontarians today.

Insufficient insurance coverage

Perhaps the most obvious area where a broker may be negligent, and the one most commonly pursued before civil courts, is in failing to provide an insured with adequate coverage to meet their needs. There are a number of circumstances in which such negligence may arise, including the issuing of a homeowner’s policy some years ago and then failing to increase the coverage in accordance with naturally rising property values in the area, or failing to increase coverage when an insured makes improvements to a property such that the value has increased, or ignoring building code upgrades which cause related increases in replacement costs of materials and structures which must be accounted for. And, of course, the circumstance upon which the majority of broker’s negligence cases are founded is a simple failure, for a variety of reasons, to institute proper coverage from the outset.

In most of the above described scenarios, the matter could easily have been resolved and any question of liability avoided, by the broker simply having a conversation with the insured, and asking any and all questions necessary to ascertaining the level and amount of coverage needed by the insured. This duty upon the broker, to initiate and pursue such conversations as a part of their fiduciary duty to the insured, is discussed in the seminal Ontario Court of Appeal decision Fine’s Flowers Ltd. v General Accident Assurance Co. of Canada [1]. In that case, the plaintiff owned and operated a greenhouse, for which he had obtained insurance coverage from an agent with whom he had established a close and continuing relationship over a number of years. In this capacity, the insured relied upon the agent to provide him counsel regarding adequacy of coverage, and requested of the agent that he see to it that the plaintiff be covered for all foreseeable and normal risks to his business. When a water pump seized, causing the greenhouse to shut down and destroying the greenhouse crops, the plaintiff claimed for damages from his insurer, at which time he was advised that the water pump was not covered in his policy. The agent appealed the finding of liability against him, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, providing as they did so a guideline to suitable broker behaviour, including the necessity of initiating a conversation with the insured in order to ensure that the broker has a firm grasp of the insured’s needs:

43   In many instances, an insurance agent will be asked to obtain a specific type of coverage and his duty in those circumstances will be to use a reasonable degree of skill and care in doing so or, if he is unable to do so, “to inform the principal promptly in order to prevent him from suffering loss through relying upon the successful completion of the transaction by the agent”: Ivamy, General Principles of Insurance Law (2nd ed. 1970), p. 464.
44.  But there are other cases, and in my view this is one of them, in which the client gives no such specific instructions but rather relies upon his agent to see that he is protected, and if the agent agrees to do business with him on those terms, then he cannot after wards, when an uninsured loss arises, shrug off the responsibility he has assumed. If this requires him to inform himself about his client’s business in order to assess the foreseeable risks and insure his client against them, then this he must do. It goes without saying that an agent who does not have the requisite skills to understand the nature of his client’s business and assess the risks that should not be insured against should not be offering this kind of service. As Haines J. said in Lahey v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., [1968] [1] O.R. 727 at 729, [1968] I.L.R. 1-194, 67 D.L.R. (2d) 506, varied [1969] 2 O.R. 833, [1969] I.L.R. 1-261 (C.A.):
The solution lies in the intelligent insurance agent who inspects the risks when he insures them, knows what his insurer is providing, discovers the areas that may give rise to dispute and either arranges for the coverage or makes certain the purchaser is aware of the exclusion.
45.  I do not think this is too high a standard to impose upon an agent who knows that his client is relying upon him to see that he is protected against all foreseeable, insurable risks. [2]

This passage makes clear that it is incumbent upon a broker, in service of his or her duty as such, to inform him or herself of an insured’s needs, particularly when an insured has clearly articulated their reliance upon the broker to provide them with the all necessary coverage.

Indeed, it is the failure to have this conversation that repeatedly gives rise to successful cases of broker’s negligence where coverage was found to be inadequate. See for example G.K.N. Keller Canada Ltd. v Hartford Fire Insurance Co.[3], Prubant v Shillington Insurance [4], Roynat Inc. v Kirkwood [5], Sandy Leather Fashion Ltd. v Continental Insurance Co. of Canada [6], and St. Louis v CIBC Mortgages Inc. [7], all successful cases of broker’s negligence where the broker failed to place adequate coverage for the insured, and in each case it was the failure of the broker to inform him or herself of the insured’s true needs, through a conversation with such insured, that substantiated the claim of negligence.

Of course, this is not to say that all such cases of broker’s negligence are successful. Take for example the case of Machat Jewellery Ltd. v Jenkins [8], in which the plaintiff jewellery store arranged for theft insurance through the defendant insurance broker. The policy provided that the insurer would not be liable for any loss that occurred when the insured was closed for business, unless during such time period 98% of the jewellery stock was stored in the safes, and the alarm system was deployed. It was the custom of the plaintiff, following close of business for the day, to take inventory of all gems, which necessitated the removal of nearly all stock from the safes, which in turn necessitated that the alarm system be disabled. When the plaintiff was robbed at gunpoint one evening while in the process of conducting this inventory, the insurer denied coverage on the basis of the exemption for coverage during closed hours. This prompted the plaintiff to sue the broker for failing to provide adequate coverage.

The court was satisfied that the broker had made several errors in the conduct of his relationship with the plaintiff, as detailed below:

15   Both Alan Symons and Jenkins expected any jeweller to take inventory and to do other work in the evenings after regular hours. Jenkins said it was usual for jewellers to sort and value diamonds in the evening. These activities would normally require far more than 2% of the gems to be out of the vault and would require that the existing alarm system be turned off. Both Symons and Jenkins knew that a substantial part of Machat’s business at the robbed premises was wholesale and manufacturing. Although I find that Machat did not specifically tell the broker that 98% of his gems were frequently out of the safe in the evening, Alan Symons and Jenkins had sufficient information to put them on the alert. In spite of their experience and expertise, they did not warn the plaintiff about the consequences of not complying with the warranties while working at night, nor that the warranty required a very high percentage of the gems at this location to be in the vault. By comparison, at the plaintiff’s other two locations, where he carried on only retail business, the policy requirements were only 65% and 80%. The broker also failed to discuss with Machat the simple alterations to the alarm system and to his own procedures which would have made compliance with the warranties possible. These included the installation of two switches, a reduction in the percentage of gems required to be in the safe, and two or three phone calls by Machat to the alarm company each evening on which he worked. [9]

However, the court ultimately dismissed the action against the broker because the insured had in fact been adequately covered at the time of the burglary:

21.  As I have said, if it were not for the evidence of Alan Symons, I would find that the premises were “not open for business” within the meaning of the policy at the time of the robbery.
22   I turn now to Alan Symons’ evidence. A highly experienced man in the jewellers block business, he said that the disputed words in the alarm and safe warranties meant that the warranties had to be complied with only when all the lights in the premises were turned off, the premises were locked and vacated by all authorized personnel. I accept this significant evidence. Its significance lies in the fact that Symons is not only an officer of the brokerage company, but is as well the president of, and able to speak for, IMG, the underwriting company. I find that in accepting the risk, setting the premium, and issuing the policy, IMG meant to cover a robbery in the circumstances of this case. Since insurance is the business of accepting risks in return for a premium commensurate with the estimated risk, it would be most illogical to hold that the policy does not cover an occurrence of a class the underwriter intended it to cover, and for which it charged a premium.
23   No evidence was led by Traders to suggest that the premium was not appropriate for the ambit of risk as understood and testified to by Alan Symons. Although he was called as a witness by the brokerage company, I am satisfied his evidence was drawn for all his capacities, including the presidency of IMG. His evidence accordingly expresses the underwriter’s view of the scope of the policy issued in Traders’ name.
24   Therefore the plaintiff’s action, based as it is on the theory that the policy did not cover the robbery in question, fails and must be dismissed. I see no reason why costs should not follow the event. [10]

The action against the broker was similarly dismissed in Pritchard v Rideau Insurance Service Ltd. [11], where the plaintiffs’ farm was destroyed by fire and the insurer denied coverage on grounds that the policy was never issued. As it turned out, the broker had never sent the plaintiffs’ completed insurance application to the insurer, such that insurance was never properly put in place. The plaintiffs commenced a claim against both the broker and the insurer, and each defendant cross-claimed against the other. At the trial, the court was satisfied that the broker had been the authorized agent of the insurer and, since he had held out to the plaintiffs that they were insured, so they were actually insured, despite the broker’s failure to submit the proper paperwork to the insurer. As such, the broker had placed the insurance as discussed and directed with the plaintiffs, which meant that he had not behaved in a negligent manner.

These cases reiterate that it is an insurance broker who bears the responsibility of familiarizing him or herself with the insured’s needs sufficiently that the specifics of the insurance required can be known, and arranged for. Failure to initiate such a conversation may, as demonstrated by these cases, lead to a successful case of broker’s negligence.


A second circumstance in which broker’s negligence may arise involves the broker arranging for issuance of a policy which excludes coverage in certain pre-defined situations. This type of negligence may arise in any number of scenarios, such as a commercial enterprise making use of vehicles for commercial purposes, and the broker failing to establish coverage for such vehicles beyond that related to personal use, or a broker initiating a policy which specifically excludes coverage in certain circumstances, which are likely or at least possible to arise in the client’s circumstances (as in the Fine’s Flowers case discussed above). Again, it is the broker’s lack of knowledge of the true needs of the insured client that likely lead to his or her negligence in such cases.

In Tactics Advertising Inc. v Hartford Insurance Co. of Canada [12], the plaintiff company operated a consulting business for which it sometimes hired independent contractors to carry out various duties. One such contractor, who had been engaged to update the plaintiff’s computer system and equipment, an important job, since the computer system was integral to the functioning of the plaintiff’s business, either stole or destroyed the entire contents of the computer system. When the plaintiff sought relief from its insurer, it discovered that the acts of independent contractors were excluded from coverage under their policy. The plaintiffs then commenced an action against the broker for damages for negligent placement of insurance coverage. Once again, it was the failure of the broker to endeavour to adequately inform himself of the plaintiff’s insurance needs, including not understanding that independent contractors would be used by the plaintiff and thus an exclusionary clause such as the one implemented in this case would be risky and inappropriate, that led to the finding of negligence against the broker:

28.  In this case, Hearn Jones Stewart and Leanne Hussey failed to make the appropriate inquiries of their client Tactics Advertising Inc. as to the nature of its business and the risks attenuate thereto. In the result, the defendants failed to identify risks and in particular, the very risk which was the subject matter of the loss in this case, failed to advise with respect to insurance coverage available or to advise with respect to risk management. These failures constituted negligence on behalf of Hearn Jones Stewart and Leanne Hussey. [13]

The broker was also found negligent for allowing an inappropriate exclusionary clause in arranging coverage in 1126389 Ontario Ltd v Dalton [14], and Carlino v H.F. Pat Simmonds Insurance Broker [15].

More recently, in Colangelo Niagara Inc. v York Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. [16], the court had occasion to dismiss a case of alleged broker’s negligence, where the broker was able to demonstrate that he had discharged his duty to the client in attempting to engage in conversations and to obtain further information necessary to truly understanding the needs of the client, but the plaintiff client failed to respond to these entreaties by the broker:

76   I find that the defendant chose to do business with the plaintiff in a situation where they knew, through their employee Mr. Wilkie, that the plaintiff’s instructions would be less than thorough with respect to the Excavator. Accordingly, the defendant owed the plaintiff the care as described in Fine’s Flowers and Fletcher.
77   I find that, in these circumstances, Mr. Wilkie undertook all reasonable steps to attempt to ensure that the Excavator was covered by the Insurance Policy and, given Mr. Colangelo’s failure to act upon Mr. Wilkie’s advice, Mr. Wilkie took all reasonable steps to ensure that Mr. Colangelo understood the ramifications of his actions.
78   Specifically, upon becoming aware of the purchase or potential purchase of the Excavator on March 4, 2012, Mr. Wilkie rightly informed Mr. Colangelo of both the 30-day grace period as well as the need to furnish specific information to the insurer in order to get the Excavator placed upon the Equipment List. When said information was not forthcoming from Mr. Colangelo, Mr. Wilkie again rightly left timely voicemails for Mr. Colangelo regarding the need for the information. In my mind, this discharged his duty to his client. Mr. Colangelo was an experienced businessman and, as a result of Mr. Wilkie’s communications, he understood both the necessity for submitting the relevant information as well as the risks associated with failing so to do. Any decision made at that point by Mr. Colangelo was either fully informed or was made pursuant to wilful blindness.
79   Nonetheless, Mr. Wilkie wrote to Mr. Colangelo via letter dated March 19, 2002 explaining the importance of receiving the necessary information and the consequences of failing to provide same. If I am wrong that Mr. Wilkie discharged his duty of care to the plaintiff prior to March 19, 2002, he certainly discharged it upon that date as there can be no doubt that Mr. Colangelo fully understood the risks associated with his decision to withhold the necessary information upon receipt of the letter. I do not believe that a broker in Mr. Wilkie’s position can force a client like Mr. Colangelo to cooperate with a broker’s request for information. The best the broker can do is to ensure that an experienced client is fully apprised of her/his options and to allow the business person to make informed decisions about the risks they are willing to bear. Mr. Wilkie did exactly that and therefore discharged his duties to his client. [17]

This case demonstrates the importance of an insured responding to a broker in a timely fashion and providing all requested information at the earliest opportunity, in order to establish that the client itself is not negligent in failing to obtain adequate and necessary coverage, and displace that responsibility onto the broker.

Optional benefits

No discussion of the importance of advising a client about the need to add some additional, optional, benefits to one’s insurance coverage can be had without reference to the seminal Supreme Court of Canada decision Fletcher v Manitoba Public Insurance Corp. [18]. In that case, the plaintiffs had purchased automobile insurance from the defendant insurer, asking the insurer to provide them the “maximum coverage available”. However, neither the broker nor the insurer mentioned to the plaintiffs the availability of underinsured motorist coverage, which could be purchased by an insured in exchange for payment of an additional premium. Several months after instituting the coverage, the plaintiffs were seriously injured in an accident that occurred in Ontario and was caused by an underinsured driver. Although they were successful in their Ontario action against the insurer and broker for failing to place adequate insurance coverage, the decision was reversed on appeal, which led to the hearing before the Supreme Court of Canada, which allowed the appeal and reinstated the trial decision.

In so deciding, the Supreme Court of Canada specifically concluded that the broker had failed in its duty of care to the insurer, and articulated such duty to be stringent and necessitating not only carrying out the insured’s wishes, but also providing advice and information to the client:

58   In my view, Fine’s Flowers stands for the proposition that private insurance agents owe a duty to their customers to provide not only information about available coverage, but also advice about which forms of coverage they require in order to meet their needs. I note that Professor H. Snow has summarized the effect of Fine’s Flowers in “Liability of Insurance Agents for Failure to Obtain Effective Coverage: Fine’s Flowers Ltd. v. General Accident Assurance Co.” (1979) 9 Man. L.J. 165, in the following terms (at p. 169):
The implication of this case and many others like it in recent years seems clear. Consumers who place their faith in insurance agents holding themselves out as competent and find their faith misplaced, will frequently be able to find recourse against the agent. … [T]he extent of the duty owed by an insurance agent, both in placing insurance and in indicating to the insured which risks are covered and which are not, as set out in this case, is a fairly stringent one for the agent. Moreover, given the general situation of the principal relying very heavily on the expertise of the agent, it does not seem to be an unreasonable burden for an insurance agent to bear.
61 In my view, it is entirely appropriate to hold private insurance agents and brokers to a stringent duty to provide both information and advice to their customers. They are, after all, licensed professionals who specialize in helping clients with risk assessment and in tailoring insurance policies to fit the particular needs of their customers. Their service is highly personalized, concentrating on the specific circumstances of each client. Subtle differences in the forms of coverage available are frequently difficult for the average person to understand. Agents and brokers are trained to understand these differences and to provide individualized insurance advice. It is both reasonable and appropriate to impose upon them a duty not only to convey information but also to provide counsel and advice. [19]

Thus, the broker’s duty to an insured is an important and strict one, to which the courts will insist a broker strictly adhere.

This case also demonstrates the importance of explaining to clients that, despite the fact that most seek out the cheapest policy available, it may not be in the best interests of the client to offer so little coverage. Particularly in this new landscape, when no fault benefits in Ontario have been reduced by half to only $1 million, brokers should be encouraging their clients to take additional coverage options, in service of their duty to ensure that they are acting in the best interests of their clients.

Of course, it is also of critical importance that, where no additional coverage options were offered or discussed between the broker and insured, the broker must be able to demonstrate that the insured would not have availed themselves of the opportunity to pay for such additional coverage, had the opportunity presented itself. In Zefferino v Meloche Monnex Insurance Co. [20], for example, the plaintiff commenced a claim against his broker on grounds that he found himself underinsured because the broker had failed to offer him the chance to purchase certain optional benefits. In dismissing the action, the court was satisfied that there was absolutely no evidence that the plaintiff would have availed himself of such optional coverage, in particular since he had never before purchased anything other than basic automobile insurance coverage. Given the lack of evidence to support his contentions that he would most certainly have taken up such additional coverage options if only he were given the chance, the fact that the broker had not offered such benefits, was essentially moot.

The opposite conclusion was reached in 1013799 Ontario Ltd. v Kent Line International Ltd. [21], wherein the court was satisfied that part of the duty imposed upon the broker necessitated that he, “…make the extension provisions known to Multi-Foods, thus giving to it the opportunity to apply for coverage that would have provided protection against the events that happened” [22], and that the broker in this case had, “failed in his duty to his customer in not bringing the extension clauses to its attention” [23]. Moreover, the court rejected the defendant broker’s contention that it was the duty of the insured to demonstrate that it would have availed itself of the extended coverage opportunities. Rather, it was clear that the broker bore the duty of demonstrating that, had it offered the optional coverage, the insured would have declined to accept it:

22   To all of this, the defendants say that it is encumbent on Multi-Foods to prove that the protection of the extension clauses would have been granted to it if it had requested it. In my opinion, that is not so. It is more appropriate that the defendants, having failed to bring the extension clauses to Multi-Foods’ attention, should have the burden of showing that even if they had done so and even if Multi-Foods had applied for the clauses to be part of its coverage the clauses would not have become part of the insurance contract. No evidence was adduced by the defendants to show — or even to suggest — that the clauses, if requested, would not have been written into the policy.
23   Equally, it would be useless to require Multi-Foods to lead evidence that if it had been made aware of the extension clauses (and of any additional premium), it would have applied for their coverage. Such evidence would be self-serving in the extreme and would constitute little more than the satisfaction of a technical requirement. That, in my view, has little value. The plain fact is that Multi-Foods was not given the opportunity to request the extended coverage and it should not now be required to put the icing on the cake by leading evidence that is by its nature almost certainly incapable either of corroboration or contradiction. [24]


Broker’s negligence may arise in a variety of circumstances, including those discussed in this paper and other, relatively rarer circumstances (see Canada Brokerlink Inc. v Patterson [25], where the broker was held liable for advising the client that only one insurer was available to provide the type of insurance sought, when in fact the insured was able to locate a policy with a different company for only one quarter of the price of the policy found by the broker, and Firestone Canada Inc. v American Home Assurance Co. [26], where the broker was found liable for allowing the insured to enter into an ambiguous contract). Regardless of the particular circumstance in which it arises, a broker is more likely to be found to have been negligent where it can be demonstrated that there was a failure on the part of the broker to fulfill his or her duty to the client in initiating a conversation with the client in order to ascertain the appropriate amount of coverage required by the insured. This duty extends beyond merely providing the client whatever is asked for, and requires instead that the broker actively seek out information, ask questions, and offer alternatives and options to the client.

In the case of optional coverage and exclusions, the broker must take care to demonstrate that the client was afforded the opportunity to consider alternatives for coverage and was advised of all risks associated with foregoing some or all additional types of coverage. Failure to do so will not necessarily be fatal though, as there is also a duty upon insureds to warrant that they respond to any enquiries made of them or clarification otherwise sought of them, by the broker. If an insured does not meet this expectation, then there is a chance that a broker can demonstrate that the insured would never have availed themselves of the opportunity to undertake additional coverage, such that the fact that the broker never had the conversation with the client, is rendered moot.

Regardless of how it arises, these cases serve to illustrate that the broker’s pockets are likely the most dependable source of negligence damages to insured Ontarians in this ever-changing landscape of motor vehicle insurance liability.

Table of Authorities

1013799 Ontario Ltd. v Kent Line International Ltd, 2000 CarswellOnt 2865, 21 CCLI (3d) 312 (OSCJ).

1126389 Ontario Ltd. v Dalton, 2000 CarswellOnt 580, 20 CCLI (3d) 68 (OSCJ).

Canada Brokerlink Inc. v Patterson, 2006 CarswellOnt 8766 (OSCJ).

Carlino v H.F. Pat Simmonds Insurance Broker, [1995] OJ No 4210, 34 CCLI (2d) 165, 61 ACWS (3d) 848 (OCJ (GD)).

Colangelo Niagara Inc. v York Fire & Insurance Casualty Insurance Co., 2013 CarswellOnt 5116, 2013 ONSC 1882.

Fine’s Flowers Ltd. v General Accident Assurance Co. of Canada, [1977] 2 ACWS 1021, 1977 CarswellOnt 54 (ONCA).

Firestone Canada Inc. v American Home Assurance Co., 2989 CarswellOnt 640, 36 CCLI 248 (OSC (HCJ)).

Fletcher v Manitoba Public Insurance Corp., 1990 CarswellOnt 1009, [1990] 3 SCR 191 (SCC).

G.K.N. Keller Canada Ltd. v Hartford Fire Insurance Co., [1983] I.L.R. 1-1656, [1983] O.J. No. 340, 19 A.C.W.S. (2d) 333 (OSC (HCJ)).

Machat Jewellery Ltd. v Jenkins, 1980 CarswellOnt 1498, [2981] ILR 1-1319, 6 ACWS (2d) 239 (OHCJ).

Pritchard v Rideau Insurance Services Ltd., 1999 CarswellOnt 2242, 14 CCLI (3d) 165 (OSCJ), aff’d at 103 ACWS (3d) 243 (ONCA).

Prubant v Shillington Insurance, [2004] O.J. No. 4487, 134 A.C.W.S. (3d) 746 (OSCJ).

Roynat Inc. v Kirkwood (1996), 36 CCLI (2d) 173 (Ont. Gen. Div.), aff’d at 1999 CarswellOnt 2272 (ONCA).

Sandy Leather Fashion Ltd. v Continental Insurance Co. of Canada (1994), 24 CCLI (2d) 191, 49 ACWS (3d) 645 (OCJ (GD)).

St. Louis v CIBC Mortgages Inc., [2004] OJ No 2681, 12 CCLI (4th) 135, 131 ACWS (3d) 1181 (OSCJ).

Tactics Advertising Inc. v Hartford Insurance Co. of Canada, 2000 CarswellOnt 710, 17 CCLI (3d) 144 (OSCJ).

Zefferino v Meloche Monnex Insurance Co., 2012 ONSC 154, aff’d at 2013 ONCA 127.


[1] Fine’s Flowers Ltd. v General Accident Assurance Co. of Canada, [1977]

[2] ACWS 1021, 1977 CarswellOnt 54 (ONCA).2 Ibid, at paras 43 – 45.

[3] G.K.N. Keller Canada Ltd. v Hartford Fire Insurance Co., [1983] I.L.R. 1-1656, [1983] O.J. No. 340, 19 A.C.W.S. (2d) 333 (OSC (HCJ)).

[4] Prubant v Shillington Insurance, [2004] O.J. No. 4487, 134 A.C.W.S. (3d) 746 (OSCJ).

[5] Roynat Inc. v Kirkwood (1996), 36 CCLI (2d) 173 (Ont. Gen. Div.), aff’d at 1999 CarswellOnt 2272 (ONCA).

[6] Sandy Leather Fashion Ltd. v Continental Insurance Co. of Canada (1994), 24 CCLI (2d) 191, 49 ACWS (3d) 645 (OCJ (GD)).

[7] St. Louis v CIBC Mortgages Inc., [2004] OJ No 2681, 12 CCLI (4th) 135, 131 ACWS (3d) 1181 (OSCJ).

[8] Machat Jewellery Ltd. v Jenkins, 1980 CarswellOnt 1498, [2981] ILR 1-1319, 6 ACWS (2d) 239 (OHCJ).

[9] Ibid, at para 15.

[10] Ibid, at paras 21 – 24.

[11] Pritchard v Rideau Insurance Services Ltd., 1999 CarswellOnt 2242, 14 CCLI (3d) 165 (OSCJ), aff’d at 103 ACWS (3d) 243 (ONCA).

[12] Tactics Advertising Inc. v Hartford Insurance Co. of Canada, 2000 CarswellOnt 710, 17 CCLI (3d) 144 (OSCJ).

[13] Ibid, at para 28.

[14] 1126389 Ontario Ltd. v Dalton, 2000 CarswellOnt 580, 20 CCLI (3d) 68 (OSCJ).

[15] Carlino v H.F. Pat Simmonds Insurance Broker, [1995] OJ No 4210, 34 CCLI (2d) 165, 61 ACWS (3d) 848 (OCJ (GD)).

[16] Colangelo Niagara Inc. v York Fire & Insurance Casualty Insurance Co., 2013 CarswellOnt 5116, 2013 ONSC 1882.

[17] Ibid, at paras 76 – 79.

[18] Fletcher v Manitoba Public Insurance Corp., 1990 CarswellOnt 1009, [1990] 3 SCR 191 (SCC).

[19] Ibid, at paras 58 and 61.

[20] Zefferino v Meloche Monnex Insurance Co., 2012 ONSC 154, aff’d at 2013 ONCA 127.

[21] 1013799 Ontario Ltd. v Kent Line International Ltd, 2000 CarswellOnt 2865, 21 CCLI (3d) 312 (OSCJ).

[22] Ibid, at para 20.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid, at paras 22 – 23.

[25] Canada Brokerlink Inc. v Patterson, 2006 CarswellOnt 8766 (OSCJ).

[26] Firestone Canada Inc. v American Home Assurance Co., 2989 CarswellOnt 640, 36 CCLI 248 (OSC (HCJ))